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Abstract
The cost of absenteeism in the UK has been estimated to be £12 billion
per annum. If productivity is some function of the health state of the worker
firms may prefer some sickness absence to universal attendance. However, when
the health state of the worker cannot be verified the firm must structure its
employment contract in order to align the workers’ incentives with its own.
The nature of the optimal contract under these circumstances has recently
been analysed by Chatterji & Tilley (2002) and Skåtun (2003) who generate
rather different theoretical results and empirical implications. In this paper we
synthesise these two approaches and reconcile their results.
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1 Introduction
The latest CBI survey on absenteeism and labour turnover (CBI (2002)) estimates
that absence from work in the UK cost business approximately £12 billion (1% of
GDP) in 2001. This considerable output loss due to absenteeism has been the main
focus of much previous literature, most of which has been empirical in nature. In
analysing the causes and consequences of absenteeism this literature has viewed ab-
sence as a form of rational shirking and hence undesirable from the perspective of
both firms and society.
More recently a new perspective has been emerging which recognises explicitly
that there is a link between productivity and health state of the worker. This
productivity-health link immediately suggests that not all absenteeism is universally
undesirable. Specifically, this new approach posits that firms may find it in their in-
terest to discourage unhealthy, low productivity workers from attending because such
workers may well have a low productivity. Thus, just as ‘healthy’ workers absenting
themselves is damaging, so might the situation in which ‘unhealthy’ workers turn up
for work.
A natural question which arises in this framework is what policies the firm may en-
gage in order to control both the quantity of absenteeism and its flip side — unhealthy
workers turning up to work. In essence firms have to design employment contracts
in such a way that healthy workers are encouraged to turn up for work whilst sick
workers are encouraged to stay at home. If health state is not ‘contractible’ — ver-
ifiable to a third party — firms who wish to sort workers according to their health
state have to design an employment contract that is incentive compatible otherwise
healthy workers may falsely claim to be ill and ill workers may falsely claim to be
healthy.
The nature of the optimal employment contract under these circumstances is
not immediately obvious. The issue has recently been independently analysed by
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Chatterji & Tilley (2002) and Skåtun (2003) who generate rather different theoretical
results and empirical implications. Chatterji & Tilley (2002) argue that the optimal
employment contract involves the firm setting two wage rates only — one for those
who attend work and one for those who stay at home. By contrast Skåtun (2003)
suggests that it is best to offer three wage rates. One for healthy workers who attend,
one for sick workers instructed to attend work, and one for all workers who stay
at home. Furthermore, in Chatterji & Tilley (2002) full sorting occurs, whereas in
Skåtun (2003) some sick workers do present themselves for work so that imperfect
sorting occurs. This short paper synthesises the two approaches and shows that the
differences in conclusions arise from different assumptions about (i) the information
that is verifiable ex ante and (ii) the variables upon which payment is conditioned. In
particular, we derive the optimal employment contract for a separating equilibrium
using two different information sets.
2 Absenteeism in the UK
The responsibilities of firms and workers when workers claim sickness absence is
determined in part by the Department of Social Security sickness absence regulations
and in part by the policies of the firm. The Department of Social Security only
requires a doctor to issue a statement to certify illness after an individual has been
absent for a week. In other cases, a worker may simply claim to be ill, i.e. to self
certify. If the individual is claiming sickness absence for at least 4 days in a row then
they can claim statutory sick pay (SSP) which is payable for up to 28 weeks in one
‘spell’ of absence. After the 28 week period is over, the individual is transferred to
Incapacity Benefit. Sickness absence periods of at least 4 days in a row with 8 weeks
or less between them are counted as one spell of absence for SSP purposes. SSP is
not payable in the first 3 days (the waiting days) of any spell.
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Barmby, Orme & Treble (1991) finds that the majority of sickness absence is in
spells of five days or less. Furthermore, using data from the Labour Force Survey,
LMT (2003) show that of those workers who were absent during a reference week,
40% of workers claimed absence for a period of only one day and approximately 75%
claimed absence for 4 days or less. Both these suggest strongly that much absenteeism
is on the basis of self certification of illness. Hence it would appear that firms are
faced with self certified illness based absence and therefore need to consider wage and
sick pay policies to align the incentives of workers with their own. Employers may
well choose to provide their own company sick pay in addition to SSP. Indeed, Brown
(1994) reports that in a survey of 1125 private and public sector employers over 70%
offered company sick pay schemes as opposed to relying exclusively on the statutory
sick pay scheme. Below we analyse these contractual arrangements using a formal
model.
3 The model
For simplicity we synthesise Chatterji & Tilley (2002) and Skåtun (2003) within a
static framework without loss of generality. A firm — the principal — is assumed
to contract with an agent to run a one-time project. The agent may be either ill,
θI , or healthy, θH , with associated probabilities ρ and (1− ρ) respectively. Only
after the contract between the parties has been signed is the agent’s health state, θ,
revealed to workers. These workers then decide whether to turn up to work or not
depending on their health state, the monetary rewards, and the disutility of working
given their health states. An agent with health state θj suffers disutility v (e, θj) if
they voluntarily present themselves at work and supply exogenous effort e; they suffer
disutility v (0, θj) if they are absent and consequently supply 0 effort.
However, in order to discourage shirking, the firm randomly selects a proportion,
(1− φ), of absent workers and forces them to work. In terms of pay setting a crucial
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question is whether or not the firm has knowledge of the ex post health state of any
worker. The key assumption in Skåtun (2003) is
‘that a firm can observe the productivity of a worker who turns up for
work, thus making it impossible for a sick worker to successfully imitate
a healthy worker at work.’ (p. 391).
This immediately implies that the firm’s employment contract can discriminate
between healthy workers who voluntarily present for work, and those ill workers who,
with probability (1− φ) will be press ganged into working. We denote these payments
by wH and wI respectively. The payment to workers who are absent from work (the
sickness pay) is denoted by wS.
An agent who is healthy (H) and presents for work (P ) receives utility V PH =
u (wH) − v (e, θH) while an agent who is healthy (H) and is absent from work (A)
receives utility V AH = u (wS) − v (0, θH). In contrast, an agent who is ill (I) and is
instructed by the firm to present for work receives utility V PI = u (wI)−v (e, θI) while
an agent who is ill and absent receives utility V AI = u (wS)− v (0, θI).
We assume that for any given level of effort the disutility when ill is greater
than when healthy, v (e, θI) > v (e, θH) and v (0, θI) > v (0, θH); for a given health
state the disutility of going to work is greater than the disutility of staying at home,
v (e, θj) > v (0, θj); and that the additional disutility of going to work when ill is
greater than when healthy, v (e, θI)− v (0, θI) > v (e, θH)− v (0, θH).1
Therefore the participation constraint of an agent is
(1− ρ) [u (wH)− v (e, θH)] + ρ (1− φ) [u (wI)− v (e, θI)] + ρφ [u (wS)− v (0, θI)] ≥ V¯
(1)
1This is the discrete analogue of the Spence-Mirrlees condition and implies that θI agents have
to be paid more for attendance than θH agents. Coupled with the lower productivity of unhealthy
workers, this provides both the opportunity and the incentive to separate the two types of agent.
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where V¯ denotes the outside option of the agent.2
Denoting the productivity of a θj agent by x (e, θj) the expected value of the
principal can be written
(1− ρ) [x (e, θH)− wH ] + ρ (1− φ) [x (e, θI)− wI ]− ρφwS. (2)
The nature of the resulting contract depends on whether full information or limited
information is assumed.
3.1 Full information
Under full information the problem facing the principal is to choose wH , wI , and wS
to maximise expected profits (Equation 2) subject to the participation constraint
(Equation 1).
If, ex ante, the principal is able to write a contract on the basis of both the health
state and presence of the agent at work the standard optimal risk sharing results
apply: a risk neutral principal will completely insure a risk averse agent against ex
post fluctuations in utility. Therefore we have
u (wH)− v (e, θH) = u (wI)− v (e, θI) = u (wS)− v (0, θI) . (3)
Since v (e, θI) > v (e, θH) Equation 3 implies
wI > wH . (4)
2One of the innovations in Skåtun (2003) is that — because ill agents at work are more likely to
infect others — the probability of illness, ρ, is an increasing function of the probability that an ill agent
is forced to work. However, the firm knows this probability, ρ (φ), and internalises this infection
‘externality’. Therefore, this is equivalent to assuming that from the perspective of workers the
probability of being healthy is fixed.
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Since v (e, θI) > v (0, θI) Equation 3 implies
wI > wS. (5)
If we further assume that v (e, θH) < v (0, θI), then wS > wH .
Thus in the full information case the results of Skåtun (2003) regarding the relative
magnitude of the three wages is confirmed. In effect, each worker is paid a wage that
fully reflects their health state and work attendance status.
3.2 Incomplete information
In general, contracts cannot be made fully contingent on health status. The pos-
sibility that agents can try and bluff about their true health state in order to gain
advantage must be taken into account by the firm. Typically this will impose a set of
incentive compatibility constraints which are designed to prevent workers exploiting
the informational advantage they have about their health status.
The two incentive compatibility constraints Skåtun (2003) imposes on the prin-
cipal’s problem are designed to ensure that healthy agents will always claim to be
healthy rather than ill and to ensure that ill agents will always claim to be ill rather
than healthy These are:
u (wH)− v (e, θH) ≥ (1− φ) [u (wI)− v (e, θH)] + φ [u (wS)− v (0, θH)] ; (6)
and
(1− φ) [u (wI)− v (e, θI)] + φ [u (wS)− v (0, θI)] ≥ u (wH)− v (0, θI) . (7)
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Recall that the key assumption in Skåtun (2003) is
Assumption 1 ‘that a firm can observe the productivity of a worker who turns up
for work, thus making it impossible for a sick worker to successfully imitate a
healthy worker at work.’ (p. 391).
Assumption 1 enables the principal to identify — and condition payment upon —
the health state of workers who attend. To see this consider a healthy worker who
claims to be ill. There is some probability, φ, that the agent’s shirking will not be
discovered. However, there is some probability, (1− φ), that the agent will be forced
to attend in which case, by Assumption 1, they will be revealed to be healthy and
should receive wH .3 Therefore the incentive compatibility constraint that ensures
healthy agents attend (Inequality 6) becomes
u (wH)− v (e, θH) ≥ u (wS)− v (0, θH) . (8)
Furthermore, since v (e, θj) > v (0, θj), it follows that wH > wS which is contrary
to Skåtun (2003).
Moreover, if Inequality 8 is satisfied all healthy workers attend and payment to ill
agents can be conditioned on health state. For example, an ill agent who is forced to
attend with probability (1− φ) is identified through Assumption 1 and an ill agent
who is absent is also identified because Inequality 8 ensures that a healthy agent
will always attend. Therefore provided Inequality 8 is satisfied the second incentive
compatibility constraint (Inequality 7) is redundant. The intuition for this result is
that the principal always wants healthy workers to attend. Inequality 8 ensures this.
In addition, the principal is only concerned that the right number of ill workers (if
any) attend. Since ill health is verifiable the principal simply selects the number of
ill agents required whether the ill agent is present or absent.
3Unless agents are fined for misreporting their health state.
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In summary, if the health state of an ill agent is verifiable:
• only one incentive compatibility constraint is required
• the optimal contract consists of three wages that maximise the principal’s ob-
jective function subject to the incentive compatibility constraint (8) and the
participation constraint which both bind with equality.4 However, the relative
magnitude of these three wages do not accord with Skåtun (2003).
The assumption that healthy workers who turn up for work voluntarily and ill
workers who are press ganged are paid different wages has little or no empirical sup-
port. If health state at work cannot be verified costlessly, then there is no possibility
of there being separate wages for healthy and ill workers. The optimal contract in a
separating equilibrium must consist of only two (rather than 3) wages. This is be-
cause the principal can only structure a contract on the basis of verifiable variables.
In this case the principal can only verify presence at or absence from work.
In addition, in order to ensure a complete sorting of agents according to their
health state as in Chatterji & Tilley (2002) there should, quite properly, be two
incentive compatibility constraints.5
In summary, if health state is not verifiable the optimal contract in a separating
equilibrium consists of:
• two incentive compatibility constraints
• two wages — a wage, w, and sick pay, s, with w > s > 0 — that sorts agents
according to their type.
4Both constraints bind with equality since the principal’s objective function is decreasing in wH ,
wS , and wI .
5There are also two pooling equilibria: one in which all agents attend and one in which all agents
stay at home. It can be shown that the principal prefers the pooled (all attend) equilibrium to the
separating equilibrium as the probability of being ill, ρ, increases.
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4 Conclusions
This paper has sought to confront the stylised facts concerning absenteeism with the
predictions of two recent theoretical papers in the area. A number of stylised facts
of absenteeism in the UK remain unexplained by Skåtun (2003). Indeed a number of
its empirical implications are simply not observed.
In particular, there are two specific predictions made by Skåtun (2003) that are
of importance in the structure of optimal contracts designed to economise on the
costs of absence. First, wS > wH implies that absent agents are paid more than
healthy agents who present for work. Second, while there is some evidence that
firms condition sick pay on the basis of previous, verifiable, absence rates (Brown
(1994)) wI 6= wH implies that agents who choose to, or are forced to, attend are
paid are according to their health state. Neither of these implications is observed
empirically. Moreover, any principal structuring their remuneration in this fashion
may also encounter adverse selection problems. Indeed, we have shown that only
in very limited circumstances can the firm actually structure a wage contract with
three components. For the most part, firms will have to seek to manage unwarranted
absence and unwarranted presence at work by use of only a two component payment
structure. This two component structure — a wage and a sickness pay — corresponds
closely to what is observed. The task of the future is to incorporate into the Chatterji
& Tilley (2002) two component pay structure, the notion that the threat of epidemics
constitutes a further hazard which the firm will seek to manage and control and which
may lead to the firm switching from the separating to the pooled equilibrium.
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